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Table	3:	Logit	Estimation	Results	of	Probability	of	Being	Chosen	to	Answer			 (I)	 (II)	 (III)	 (IV)	 (V)	Female	 -0.050**	 -0.056***	 	 	 	(0.020)	 (0.021)	 	 	 	Dominant	 	 0.194***	 0.193***	 	 0.195***		 (0.017)	 (0.017)	 	 (0.017)	Male	Captain	 	 0.003	 	 0.004	 0.004		 (0.019)	 	 (0.019)	 (0.019)	Female	and	Female	Captain	 	 	 0.030	 	 		 	 (0.045)	 	 	Female	and	Male	Captain	 	 	 -0.077***	 	 		 	 (0.022)	 	 	Male	and	Female	Captain	 	 	 -0.024	 	 		 	 (0.021)	 	 	Non-Dominant	Female	 	 	 	 -0.079***	 		 	 	 (0.025)	 	Dominant	Male	 	 	 	 0.173***	 		 	 	 (0.019)	 	Dominant	Female	 	 	 	 0.181***	 		 	 	 (0.033)	 	Female	in	a	Low	Confidence	Group	 	 	 	 	 -0.055**		 	 	 	 (0.027)	Female	in	a	High	Confidence	Group	 	 	 	 	 -0.046*		 	 	 	 (0.026)	Male	in	a	High	Confidence	Group	 	 	 	 	 0.012		 	 	 	 (-0.009)	Controls	for	average	confidence,	cumulative	percent	of	answers	correct,	and	stakes	 NO	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	Fixed	Effects	for	Year	and	Question	Timing	 NO	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	Observations	 3,816	 3,382	 3,382	 3,382	 3,382	R-squared	 0.003	 0.047	 0.049	 0.049	 0.047	
Omitted	Condition	in	Interaction	 	 	 Male	and	Male	Captain	 Non-Dominant	Male	 Male	in	a	Low	Confidence	Group		 	 	 *	p<0.10,	**	p<0.05,	***	p<0.001		 	 Standard	errors	clustered	on	episode	
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Table	4:	F-tests	on	Interaction	Coefficients	from	OLS	Estimates	(H0	:	β1	=	β2)	β1	 β2	 F-statistic	 P-value	Female	and	Male	Captain	 Female	and	Female	Captain	 3.524	 0.066*	Non-Dominant	Female	 Dominant	Female	 37.320	 0.000***	Female	in	a	Low	Confidence	Group	 Female	in	a	High	Confidence	Group	 0.144	 0.706		 *	p<0.10,	**	p<0.05,	***	p<0.001	
	










































































































































III	 	 IV	Non-Dominant	Male	in	GT	 0.091	 	 Non-First	Proposer	Male	in	GT	 0.098	(0.106)	 	 (0.099)	Dominant	Male	in	GT	 0.170	 	 First	Proposer	Male	in	GT	 0.305***	(0.113)	 	 (0.104)	Dominant	Male	in	NGT	 0.048	 	 First	Proposer	Male	in	NGT	 0.199*	(0.115)	 	 (0.112)	Dominant	Female	in	GT	 -0.047	 	 First	Proposer	Female	in	GT	 0.437***	(0.150)	 	 (0.088)	Non-Dominant	in	GT	 0.073	 	 Non-First	Proposer	Female	in	GT	 -0.023	(0.105)	 	 (0.105)	Dominant	Female	in	NGT	 0.183*	 	 First	Proposer	Female	in	NGT	 0.260**	(0.105)	 	 (0.107)	Non-Dominant	Female	in	NGT	 0.153	 	 Non-First	Proposer	Female	in	NGT	 0.179*	(0.097)	 	 (0.093)	Confidence	 0.050***	 	 Confidence	 0.048***	(0.016)	 	 (0.016)	Total	Score	in	Individual	Task	 -0.000	 	 Total	Score	in	Individual	Task	 -0.000	(0.001)	 	 (0.001)	Submitted	Final	Answer	First	 0.189***	 	 Submitted	Final	Answer	First	 	(0.053)	 	 	Dominant	in	Chat	 	 	 Dominant	in	Chat	 0.034		 	 (0.058)	Controls	for	Race,	GPA,	Age,	Round	and	prior	familiarity	with	task	 YES	 	 Controls	for	Race,	GPA,	Age,	Round	and	prior	familiarity	with	task	 YES	Observations	 276	 	 Observations	 276	R-squared	 0.159	 	 R-squared	 0.165	
Omitted	Condition	in	Interaction	 Non-Dominant	Male	in	the	NGT	 	 Omitted	Condition	in	Interaction	
Non-First	Proposer	Male	in	the	NGT		 	 	 *	p<0.10,	**	p<0.05,	***	p<0.001		 	 	 Robust	standard	errors	
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Chapter	5:				Conclusions	and	Further	Research		 Both	the	results	from	the	observational	data	and	the	experimental	data	point	to	a	similar	conclusion:	women	who	are	comparable	to	their	male	counterparts	in	ability,	dominance	and	confidence	experience	bias	in	group	discussion	forums.	This	trend	in	the	workplace	could	result	in	adverse	outcomes	for	women,	simply	because	their	contributions	are	not	being	appropriately	valued	and	reported	to	those	in	the	position	to	make	decisions	about	promotions	and	raises.	This	could	also	harm	firms	in	general,	if	good	ideas	are	being	discounted	or	ignored	simply	because	of	the	gender	of	those	who	propose	them.		 In	this	study,	due	to	time	and	budget	constraints,	I	was	not	able	to	identify	the	source	of	the	discrimination	as	strictly	statistical	or	taste-based.	Further	research	will	include	conducting	sessions	of	all	of	the	treatments	described	in	Table	6.	Additionally,	two	components	of	the	experimental	design	will	be	changed	for	the	purpose	of	getting	better	measures	of	each	subject’s	preferences	for	the	group’s	representative.	Instead	of	simply	choosing	one	person	as	representative,	subjects	will	be	asked	to	rank	all	members	of	their	group,	which	will	provide	a	much	more	detailed	measure	of	the	group’s	collective	opinion	of	an	individual.	We	will	also	ask	subjects	for	their	best	guesses	about	the	answers	to	the	questions	before	they	discuss	with	their	teammates,	and	then	allow	them	to	update	this	guess	afterwards.	This	will	allow	us	to	observe	their	best	idea	prior	to	the	chat,	which	can	be	used	as	a	proxy	for	how	they	would	have	answered	individually.		 My	results	suggest	that	in	order	to	avoid	a	bad	outcome	relative	to	a	reality	in	which	gender	is	not	observable,	women	must	be	‘quality’	dominant.	Unlike	men,	women	do	not	seem	to	benefit	simply	from	making	their	voices	heard	often	and	loudly.	Additionally,	women	cannot	afford	to	not	contribute,	whereas	men	are	able	be	less	inventive	and	still	
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Answers	 Points		Fault	 25	Foul	 17	Love	 14	Out	 10	Order	 6	Net	 4	Point	 3	






	In	 this	 part	 of	 the	 experiment,	 you	will	 participate	 in	 4	 rounds	 of	 decision-making	 as	 a	member	 of	 a	 group	 of	 4	 participants.	 In	 each	 round,	 individual	 participants	 will	 be	 re-matched	to	form	new	groups.		




















	In	 this	 part	 of	 the	 experiment,	 you	will	 participate	 in	 4	 rounds	 of	 decision-making	 as	 a	member	 of	 a	 group	 of	 4	 participants.	 In	 each	 round,	 individual	 participants	 will	 be	 re-matched	to	form	new	groups.		











	In	 this	 part	 of	 the	 experiment,	 you	will	 participate	 in	 4	 rounds	 of	 decision-making	 as	 a	member	 of	 a	 group	 of	 4	 participants.	 In	 each	 round,	 individual	 participants	 will	 be	 re-matched	to	form	new	groups.		
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	In	 this	 part	 of	 the	 experiment,	 you	will	 participate	 in	 4	 rounds	 of	 decision-making	 as	 a	member	 of	 a	 group	 of	 4	 participants.	 In	 each	 round,	 individual	 participants	 will	 be	 re-matched	to	form	new	groups.		
	Before	you	begin	your	group	interaction,	we	will	ask	you	to	submit	your	first	name	on	the	computer.	You	may	use	your	actual	first	name,	a	nickname,	or	any	other	preferred	name.		If	there	is	more	than	one	subject	in	your	group	with	the	same	name,	we	will	randomly	assign	a	unique	numerical	value	to	accompany	the	name.	For	example,	if	there	are	two	individuals	named	Alex	in	your	group,	we	will	distinguish	between	them	as	Alex1	and	Alex2.		To	make	sure	 you	 have	 completed	 this	 step,	 we	 will	 also	 conduct	 a	 verbal	 roll	 call	 of	 all	 group	members.	


























































¨	Lack	of	confidence	in	my	own	proposals			 15.	Did	you	recognize	anyone	in	your	group	as	a	personal	friend,	colleague,	or	classmate?		 ¨		Yes				 ¨		No		If	yes,	did	that	knowledge	change	your	decisions	in	the	experiment?		 ¨		Yes				 ¨		No	If	yes,	please	explain	how	so:	__________________________			 16.	Did	you	use	your	real	name	in	the	experiment?	(only	for	treatments	with	name	identifier).		 ¨		Yes				 ¨		No	
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